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11. Introduction and summary
In Ghiglino and Shell (2000), we analyzed the economic eﬀects of constitutional or other
restrictions on the government budget deﬁcit. We assumed that private agents have
access to perfect markets for borrowing and lending. This is a non-trivial assumption.
If government borrowing is restricted but private borrowing is unconstrained, then the
government can ease the eﬀects of its own borrowing restrictions by in eﬀect “borrowing
oﬀ the books” by increasing the early-life taxes on some individuals while at least partially
oﬀsetting this by increasing late-life subsidies to the same individuals. In the real world,
some consumers do face binding credit constraints or other imperfections in the borrowing
market. It is natural to ask how these aﬀect the government’s ability to avoid restrictions
on its deﬁcit.
In the present paper, we assume that the government and individuals face credit
restrictions. The restrictions on the government are from the constitution or other law,
or from international borrowing agreements. The reasons for private credit constraints
include imperfect collateral and other “moral hazards”. The sources of private credit
rationing will not be analyzed here. We simply assume that there are exogenously given
private credit constraints which possibly diﬀer across individuals.
Following Ghiglino and Shell (2000), we adopt a pure-exchange overlapping-generations
model with several consumers per generation and several commodities per period. We
allow for non-distorting lump-sum taxes and distorting consumption taxes. We also allow
for the fact that tax schedules cannot be made perfectly individual-speciﬁc. In this paper,
we focus for simplicity on the perfectly anonymous case in which each consumer from the
same generation faces the same tax situation.
We use — with apology — the classic economic deﬁnitions 1 of relevance and irrelevance
applied in this case to government-budget-deﬁcit restrictions. The government-budget-
deﬁcit restriction is said to be irrelevant if the set of achievable allocations is unaﬀected
by the restriction. Otherwise, the restriction is said to be relevant.O f c o u r s e , s a y i n g
that the restriction is irrelevant is not saying that the restriction does not matter. If the
restriction either directly or indirectly aﬀects expectations in such a manner that it aﬀects
the selection of the equilibrium, then the restriction does matter.
If private credit is unconstrained, and there are lump-sum taxes, then budget deﬁcit
restrictions are (globally) irrelevant 2. If private credit is constrained but these constraints
are not binding on any individual and the only tax instruments are anonymous lump-sum
taxes, then we have weak (local) irrelevance of the government budget restrictions. If
some credit constraints are binding, then with only anonymous lump-sum taxes even
local irrelevance is unlikely or impossible.
If there are private credit constraints, the case with only consumption taxes is more
interesting. Surprisingly, consumption taxes, although distorting, are more likely to pro-
1See Barro (1974). See also Ghiglino and Shell (2000) and the references therein.
2See Ghiglino and Shell (2000), Proposition 5.
2vide (at least some form of) irrelevance than lump-sum taxes. With credit constraints and
anonymous consumption taxes, there is weak (local) irrelevance if the number of tax in-
s t r u m e n t si ss u ﬃciently large and at least one consumer’s credit constraint is not binding.
This generalizes the result for the case with no private credit constraints 3. In particular,
we show that if the number of commodities is no less than the sum of the number of
individuals plus the number of individuals for whom credit rationing is binding, then the
deﬁcit restriction is weakly (locally) irrelevant 4.
Why is weak (i.e. local) budget-deﬁcit irrelevance more likely with anonymous con-
sumption taxes than with anonymous lump-sum taxes? Their advantage to the govern-
ment is that they can be used to transfer income from one consumer to another in the
same generation, even when tax rates are anonymous. Such transfers are impossible with
only anonymous lump-sum taxation.
2. The model
We employ a pure-exchange overlapping-generations model in which there are n diﬀerent
consumers per generation and ` perishable commodities per period. We suppose without
loss of generality that consumers live for two periods. The government collects taxes,
distributes transfers (negative taxes), and ﬁnances government consumption. We focus on
two types of government instruments: (non-distorting) lump-sum taxes and (distorting)
consumption taxes. We assume that lump-sum taxes and consumption tax rates must be
the same for every member of a given generation, but that consumption taxes can vary
freely over the l commodities. For the general case, see Ghiglino and Shell (2000), which
allows for more general consumer tax classes and more general commodity tax classes.
We assume that government consumption of commodities is exogenously determined. It
is denoted by the sequence g =( g1,...,gt,...)w i t hgt ∈ Rl
+ for t =1 ,2,...I ti sa s s u m e d
that use of capital markets is constrained, viz. each individual faces exogenously given
constraints on his borrowing.
Our set-up is based on the Samuelson (1958) overlapping-generations model presented
in Balasko and Shell (1980, 1981, 1986), but new tax instruments and the individual
credit constraints must be deﬁned. As in Balasko and Shell (1981), let ms
th ∈ R be the
lump-sum money transfer to consumer h of generation t in period s;i fms
th is negative,
then the consumer is paying a lump-sum tax. Following Ghiglino and Shell (2000), we let
τsi
th ∈ R be the present (or nominal) tax rate levied on consumer h of generation t on his






++ be the vector of consumption in period s by indi-
3See Ghiglino and Shell (2000), Proposition 12.
4If none of the private credit constraints are binding, this inequality reduces (as it should) to the one
in Proposition 12 of Ghiglino and Shell (2000)





++ be the vector of commodity
endowments in period s of individual h from generation t for t = 0,1, ... , s = 1,2,...,
and h = 1, ..., n. Let ms
t ∈ R be the money transfer in period s to each consumer from




t ) ∈ R` be the vector of anonymous consumption
tax rates in period s for consumers from generation t. Consumers from generation 0 are
alive in period 1, while consumers from generation t (t = 1,2,... ,) are alive in periods t
and t + 1. Hence it is convenient to deﬁne the following vectors:
x0h = x1
0h ∈ R`
++,x th =( xt
th,x
t+1




++, ωth =( ωt
th,ω
t+1
th ) ∈ R2`
++,
m0 = m1
0 ∈ R,m t =( mt
t,m
t+1
t ) ∈ R2,
and
τ0 = τ1
0 ∈ R`, τt =( τt
t,τ
t+1
t ) ∈ R2`.
Let ps =( ps1,...,psi,...,ps`) ∈ R`
++ be the vector of present (before-tax) prices for









t ) ∈ R
`
++
be the present after-tax vector of commodity prices facing consumers of generation t





1 + τ0 ∈ R
`












t ) ∈ R
2`
++ for t =1 ,2,...
Then deﬁne the following quantity and price sequences: x =( ( x0h)h=n
h=1,..., (xth)h=n
h=1,...),
ω =( ( ω0h)h=n
h=1,...,(ωth)h=n
h=1,...), p =( p1,...,pt,...), m =( m0,..., mt,...), τ =( τ0,...,τt,...)
and q =( q0,...,qt,...).
We assume that the preferences of consumer h from generation t can be described by
the utility function uth deﬁned over the consumption set of all strictly positive xt’s (i.e.
R`
++ or R2`
++) with the properties:
4(i) uth is twice diﬀerentiable with strictly positive ﬁrst-order derivatives and
with corresponding negative deﬁnite Hessian
and




These rather standard assumptions simplify the comparative statics 5.N o t et h a tw eh a v e
also assumed that the endowment of the consumer lies in his consumption set, i.e. we




th ∈ R+ be the maximum credit available in money units in period s to consumer
h from generation t. The behavior of consumer h (h = 1,2, ...,n)f r o mg e n e r a t i o nt

































th ∈ R is the gross money holding in period s by consumer h of generation t.
The last equation in (2.2) is the requirement that the consumer’s indebtedness be zero
in his ﬁnal period of life. The borrowing constraint is not binding on consumer h if in
equilibrium xtm
th > −bt
th. The inequality in (2.2) is the credit constraint. We have implicitly
assumed in writing (2.2) that the borrowing constraint of at least one consumer is not
binding, so that we can use the usual no-arbitrage argument to establish that the present




m ∈ R+ (2.3)
5See Balasko (1988). See Balasko and Shell (1980, 1981) for their application in overlapping-
generations models.
5where ps,m ∈ R+ is the present price of money in period s =1 ,2,···. Assuming that the
economy is in proper monetary equilibrium, we can without loss of generality set pm = 1.
The nominal (coupon) rate of interest on money is assumed without loss of general-
ity to be zero. Hence the only return on holding money is the capital gain relative to
commodities. Condition (2.3) is thus that money appreciate in value relative to any com-
modity at the commodity rate of interest. For consumers for which the credit restriction














= pt · ωt







for h = 1,2, ...,n and t = 1,2, ..., where by choice of numeraire we set q1
01 =1 . T h e
transfers mt =( mt
t,m
t+1
t ) ∈ R2 aﬀect the behavior of the consumer only through the




It remains to describe the behavior of the older generation (t = 0)i np e r i o d1.C o n -


















We assume in this paper that the government has at its disposal either anonymous lump-
sum taxation or anonymous consumption taxation. Thus, the government’s ﬁscal policy
is either the sequence of anonymous lump-sum transfers m or the sequence of the con-
sumption tax rates τ.
6Let dt be the present (also the dollar) value of the government budget deﬁcit in period

































for t =1 ,2,...L e td denote the sequence (d1,...,dt,...). Let δt be the present (and nominal)
value of the constitutionally imposed deﬁcit restriction (assumed for convenience in the
form of an equality) in period t.L e t δ denote the sequence (δ1,...,δt,...). The budget
deﬁcit restriction is then
d = δ.
4. Equilibrium
We maintain throughout this paper some strong assumptions. We suppose perfect-
foresight on the part of consumers and the government. We also suppose that the gov-
ernment is able to perfectly commit to its announced ﬁscal policy.
Next we deﬁne equilibrium in the economy with taxes.
Deﬁnition Given the sequence of endowments ω, the feasible ﬁscal policy m or τ,
the exogenous consumption g, the behavior of consumers described by the systems (2.2),
(2.4) and (2.5), the numeraire choice yielding p11 =1, the (further) monetary normaliza-
tion yielding pm = 1 and the deﬁcit-restriction sequence δ,aconstitutional competitive
equilibrium is deﬁned by a positive price sequence p and the allocation sequence x such

















and the deﬁcit restriction d = δ is satisﬁed.
From Balasko and Shell (1980), one might expect that the existence of competitive
equilibrium to be guaranteed in “nice” overlapping-generation models, but this does not
extend to our Deﬁnition. There are three reasons that competitive equilibrium as deﬁned
above could fail to exist. The ﬁrst reason is because we are seeking a proper monetary
7equilibrium, one for which the price of money is strictly positive. For a proper monetary
equilibrium to exist the ﬁscal policy must be bonaﬁde6. The second reason applies only
to commodity taxation. It might not be possible to equilibrate supply and demand while
maintaining the positivity of the two price sequences p and q. T h et h i r dr e a s o ni st h a t
equilibrium may fail to exist because of excessive government consumption.
When the model is stationary, i.e., preferences, endowments, and government con-
sumption are constant across generations, one is tempted to focus on equilibria in which
allocations are constant across periods. We provide separate deﬁnitions of the steady
s t a t ef o rt h et w ot h et a xr e g i m e s .
Deﬁnition L (Steady state with lump-sum taxes): Let p =( p1,···,p t,···) ∈
(Rl
++)∞ be the equilibrium sequence of commodity prices when the ﬁscal policy is given






t ,···). These describe a
steady-state equilibrium if there is a vector p ∈ Rl















for t =1 ,2,···, where m1 = m1
1 and m0 = m1
0.
Deﬁnition C (Steady state with consumption-taxes): Let p =( p1,···,p t,···) ∈
(Rl
+)∞ be an equilibrium vector of before-tax commodity prices when the ﬁscal policy is






t ,···) ∈ (Rl)∞.T h e s e
describe a steady-state equilibrium if there is a vector p ∈ Rl
















for t =1 ,2,···,w h e r eτ1 = τ1
1 and τ0 = τ1
0.
When focusing on steady states it makes sense to focus on budget deﬁcits d =




for t =1 ,2,... From Walras’s law and market clearing, we have the two steady-state
relations:

















+ d =0 ( S S - L )





















+ d = 0 (SS-C)
for consumption taxation, where τ1i ∈ R is the ith component of τ1. The steady-state
conditions (SS-L) and (SS-C) do not directly involve government consumption, but steady-
state g = gt for t =1 ,2,···is implied through the equilibrium allocations and prices. If
d =0 , from (SS-L) and (SS-C), we have the familiar OG steady-state result that either
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei sz e r o( β = 1) or aggregate savings is zero. Our aim is to ﬁnd conditions
under which the government is able to “avoid” the restrictions on its deﬁcit with changing
neither its own consumption nor the consumption of any private consumer. When this is
possible the deﬁcit restriction is said to be irrelevant. We recall the formal deﬁnitions
given in Ghiglino and Shell (2000).
Deﬁnition. Irrelevance of the deﬁcit restriction. Let g be government consump-
tions and let x be an allocation that can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium
with some feasible ﬁscal policy m (resp. τ) and with the resulting deﬁcits given by the
sequence d. The deﬁcit restriction d = δ is said to be irrelevant if for any other deﬁcit
restriction sequence δ0 there exists a feasible ﬁscal policy m (resp. τ)t h a ti m p l e m e n t st h e
allocation x as a competitive equilibrium and is compatible with g, but with the resulting
deﬁcit given by the sequence δ0.
The above notion of irrelevance is very strong because it involves any possible deﬁcit
sequence other than the pre-reform, or baseline, deﬁcit d. In many situations such an
irrelevance fails to obtain.
We put forward a weaker notion of irrelevance. The ﬁrst characteristic of the weaker
deﬁcit restriction is that it only applies to a ﬁnite number of periods. Deﬁne δ(T)=
(δ1,δ2,...,δt,...,δT) ∈ RT as a deﬁcit restriction of (ﬁnite) length T. For a competitive
equilibrium to be weakly constitutionally feasible the deﬁcit in period t, dt,m u s tb ee q u a l
to δt if t =1 ,2,...,T, but for t>T, the deﬁcit is unrestricted. The second characteristic
of the weaker deﬁcit restriction is that only restrictions “near to” the base-line deﬁcit are
considered, i.e., only period-by-period deﬁcits that are not too diﬀerent from the baseline
deﬁcits are considered. In other words, only a neighborhood of the original sequence
is considered (in any topology, since the sequence is ﬁnite). According to the weaker
notion of irrelevance only restrictions of ﬁnite length δ(T)t h a tb e l o n gt oaﬁrst T-period
neighborhood of the base deﬁcit vector d =( d1,d 2,...,d t,...,d T,...), denoted DT(d),
are considered.
Deﬁnition. Weak irrelevance of the deﬁcit restriction Let g be the govern-
ment consumptions and let x be an allocation that can be implemented as a competitive
9equilibrium with some feasible ﬁscal policy m (resp. τ) and with the resulting deﬁcits
given by the sequence d.Ad e ﬁcit restriction is said to be weakly irrelevant if for any T
there is a set DT(d) such that for all δ ∈ DT(d) there is a ﬁscal policy m
0 (resp. τ
0) that
implements the allocations x and g, but with the resulting deﬁcit given by the sequence
δ.
Note that the time horizon of the deﬁcit speciﬁcation is arbitrary and may be any
finite number T.
5. Relevance of government budget deﬁcit restrictions with lump-
sum taxes
The relevance of government deﬁcit restrictions is ﬁrst investigated in economies in which
some consumers face credit constraints and only lump-sum taxation is available. It is
shown that deﬁcit restrictions are likely to be relevant unless the government can use
non-anonymous taxes. In the leading example considered below, the government uses
only anonymous lump-sum taxes and transfers and thus has no way to treat diﬀerently
the consumers, so that the likely outcome is that some consumers are hurt or beneﬁted
by the ﬁscal scheme.
For general overlapping-generations economies with perfect borrowing markets and
lump-sum taxes and transfers, restrictions on the government budget have no impact on
the set of equilibrium allocations (see Ghiglino and Shell (2000), Proposition 5). The
reason for this is that in these economies only the present value of taxes and transfers,
not their timing, matters to consumers. In this case, the government can “borrow oﬀ the
books” from taxpayers by adjusting the timing of individual taxes and transfers.
When credit restrictions are included, weak (or local) irrelevance of the budget deﬁcit
restriction obtains if non-anonymous taxes can be personalized to some consumer whose
constraint is not binding. Being able to personalize taxes is not always possible. If this
is not possible, then matters dramatically change. This is illustrated in the following
example. For simplicity, a stationary equilibrium is considered. This amounts to ignoring
the transition path. In other words, in this example we will assume that a suitable
money transfer is made so that the economy “starts” at the steady state and only deﬁcit
speciﬁcations from t = 2 onward are considered7.
Example (Relevance of government deﬁcit restrictions when consumer credit
is constrained): Let the economy be stationary with one commodity per period and
two consumers. Perfectly anonymous lump-sum taxation is available. No other tax in-
struments are available. The two consumers, 1 and 2, have log-linear utility functions
7Another, equivalent, way to view steady states is to consider a model with no beginning as well as
no end (see Ghiglino and Tvede (1995)).
10uth = 1/2 log x
t
th + 1/2 log x
t+1
th












Consider generation t. Suppose that the borrowing of consumer 1 is unconstrained,
bt
t1 = ∞, but that consumer 2 cannot borrow, bt
t2 = 0. At a steady state the individual
demands of the consumers depend on the interest factor β. When the credit constraint is


































because then the credit restriction is binding.
Suppose that gt = 1 for t =1 ,2,... Without credit restrictions β =0 .89498 and β =
0.093112 solve the equilibrium equations, but β =0 .89498 is not an equilibrium interest
factor because the borrowing constraint for consumer 2 is violated. The steady-state













Since the government is not taxing any consumer, the associated deﬁcit is dt = ptgt =
pt =( 0 .89408)t−1 in present or nominal units.
Suppose now that the government is required to balance its budget in every period,
so that dt = δt = 0 for t = 2,3, ... . We will show that the new restriction on the
deﬁcits leads to a modiﬁcation of the existing allocation. First, note that in order to keep
unchanged the consumption of consumer 1, β should be unchanged at β =0 .89408. Now,
the government can either tax the young or tax the old. Suppose ﬁrst that consumers are
taxed in their youth and receive transfers in their old age. The procedure is similar to that
used in the proof of Proposition 5 in Ghiglino and Shell (2000). Since the consumers of
the same generation are perfectly anonymous for tax purposes, suppose that we tax each
y o u n ge q u a l l yw i t hal u m p - s u mt a x−m2
2 > 0 and no tax on the consumers born in the ﬁrst
period, m2
1 = 0. The government budget constraint is then βt−1gt +2m2
2 =0s ot h a tm2
21
= m2
22 = −β/2( o r1 /2 in current terms) in order that the deﬁcit be zero, d2 =0 .N o t e
in the next period, these same consumers have to be compensated by a positive transfer
of β/2 in present terms, or 1/(2β) in current terms. After the transfer, the endowments
(in current terms) of consumer 2 are (0.75 − 0.5,1+0 .5β). At β =0 .89408, consumer
2 would still like to borrow. However, due to the borrowing constraint his ﬁrst period
consumption is now 0.25. The equilibrium allocation has been aﬀected by the ﬁscal policy.
The other possibility is to subsidize the young and tax the old. A similar reasoning shows
that also in this case the ﬁscal policy aﬀects the equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the
deﬁcit sequence is relevant. ¤
The previous example shows that when some consumers are credit-constrained, anony-
mous lump-sum taxes are not powerful enough to achieve irrelevance of the government
budget deﬁcit. This is generalized in the following
Proposition (Relevance of the government deﬁcit restrictions with credit
constraints):L e tt h ea l l o c a t i o nx be implemented as a constitutional competitive equi-
librium with a ﬁscal policy consisting only of lump-sum taxes and transfers compatible
with the deﬁcit restriction δ. If at least one consumer’s credit constraint is binding then
the deﬁcit sequence δ is weakly (and strongly) relevant.O t h e r w i s e ,i ti sweakly irrelevant.
Proof: If no consumer’s credit constraint is binding, then Proposition 5 in Ghiglino and
Shell (2000) applies. However, in general as the government only employs anonymous
taxes any transfer changes his actual borrowings (or savings) and therefore aﬀects his
demand for commodities. Indeed, assume there are two consumers and that h =2i st h e
consumer whose credit constraint is binding (if the credit constraint of consumer 1 is also
binding then the deﬁcit restriction is obviously relevant). Consider consumer 2 ﬁrst.





























Writing down the ﬁrst-order conditions, it is clear that the allocation is unchanged pro-
vided the normalized prices and normalized ﬁrst and second period incomes are unchanged
by the new ﬁscal policy. This implies that both pt/pt1 and pt+1/pt+1,1 are unaﬀected by
the policy change. The similar condition for the incomes implies that
−bm
t2 + mt
t = pt,1Wt and − bm
t2 + m
t+1




t+1 ∈ Rl are unaﬀected by the policy change. On the other hand, the gov-

































However, in order to keep consumer 1 unaﬀected by the ﬁscal policy, pt+1,1/pt,1 should
also be kept constant and, as p1,1 =1 , the entire sequence of prices should remain un-
changed. As a result, the deﬁcit sequence δ is entirely predetermined. ¤
Remark: If the government were able to use personalized lump-sum taxes, then the
deﬁcit sequence δ would be weakly irrelevant. Indeed, renumber the consumers so that
consumer 1 is the unconstrained consumer and reproduce the proof of Proposition 5 in
Ghiglino and Shell (2000).
136. Restoring irrelevance with consumption taxes
In this section we assume that only anonymous taxes on consumption are available. The
question is then whether the government is able to “avoid” the deﬁcit restriction with
these instruments even though some consumers are credit constrained. As in the case
with unconstrained borrowing and lending, the answer depends on the number of tax
instruments compared to the number of goals (consumers) and on the duration (in periods)
of the restriction. We start our analysis by an example.
Example (Irrelevance of deﬁcit restrictions in an economy with several
tax instruments ): Consider a stationary, overlapping-generations economy with four
commodities per period (` = 4) and two consumers per generation (n = 2). Assume
that the second consumer faces credit restrictions while the other has free access to the
credit market. The government has a constant consumption in the ﬁrst good only, gt =





































2 =1 2 0 ,ω
01
2 =2 5 0 ,
ω
12
1 = 500, ω
02
2 = 1000, and ω
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1/85 /81 /81 /8






1/41 /41 /56 /20
1/51 /41 /46 /20
¸
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t for k =1 ,..,4a n dt =1 ,2,...
For convenience, we look at steady-state competitive equilibrium. As noted earlier, we
will only consider the periods from t = 2 onward. First, we assume that the government
ﬁnances its consumption by running a deﬁcit, i.e. we look at a steady state with τtk
t =0
and τtk
t−1 =0 . By restricting our attention to prices of the form ptk =( β)t−1pk,k=1 ,...,4,

























k=1 =( 2 3 8 .8603,279.1068,229.0573,235.8228).
The associated deﬁcit is pt1 =( β)t−1p1 =( β)t−1 =( 1 .03351)t−1 in present and nominal
terms. In current units, the savings are -275.1889 for consumer 1, 367.7109 for consumer
2 producing an aggregate savings of 92.5221.
The issue is whether (τt
t−1,τt
t)4
k=1 can be used in order to meet the deﬁcit requirement
δt =0i np e r i o dt without disturbing the allocations given previously. Such a tax scheme
must at least satisfy for each t (t =2 ,3,...) the following equations
x
tk






































































A natural candidate for a solution to the ﬁrst four equations of (6.1) is of the form
ptk =( β)t−1pk, τtk
t =( β)t−1τ0k,a n dτtk
t−1 =( β)t−1τ 1k,w h e r eβ ∈ R is the interest factor,
τ0k ∈ R is the present and nominal value of the tax rate on the young and τ1k ∈ R is the
present and nominal value of the tax rate on the old.
15In this example, consumer 2 is assumed to face a binding credit constraint while the
government cannot personalize his taxes. Then it is required that his saving or borrowing
should remain exactly as they were in the untaxed situation. The budget equation for
























































We should point out that in the absence of taxes, a strictly positive government con-
sumption is ﬁnanced through a permanent deﬁcit (see Equation (SS-C)) implying that
both aggregate and individual savings are non-zero and β is diﬀerent from unity.
S i n c ew ea s s u m et h a tc o n s u m e r ’ s2s a v i n g sa r en o ta ﬀected by the ﬁscal policy, if b β is
















2 for any t.
These equations imply that b β should remain unaﬀected by the introduction of taxes,






























In this example the total system is composed of 11 equations; 7 normalized prices, 2
normalized incomes, the government budget deﬁcit equation and Equation (CS) concern-
ing the individual borrowing/savings constraint. On the other hand, there are 3 prices
16(β is ﬁxed) and 8 taxes. Hence a solution to the set of equations is likely to exist. The














k=1 =( 0 .22449,0.07003,0.3477,−0.7837).
Finally, the saving is now -367.7109 for consumer 1 and 367.7109 for consumer 2, so
that aggregate savings are zero. This last result agrees with Equation (SS-C) as in the
new situation a balanced budget (δ = 0) co-exists with β diﬀerent from unity, implying
that the aggregate savings are zero.¤
The previous example illustrates the mechanism for irrelevance. Starting from a steady
state with non-zero aggregate savings, there is a tax scheme which keeps the interest rate
unchanged while achieving a zero government budget deﬁcit. In the new situation, the
government is taxing the consumers just enough to balance its budget. Moreover, this
tax-transfer is such that aggregate, after tax, savings become zero. In this game, the
change in the aggregate savings is completely done through the unrestricted consumer. A
further important fact is that the taxes required to obtain irrelevance are age-anonymous
in the sense that the tax to be applied on the young and on the old is the same.
The role played by the consumer whose credit constraint is not binding is crucial.
Indeed, if all consumers would be kept at their initial levels of borrowing or saving,
achieving irrelevance would be impossible. This is clearly seen by considering an economy
consisting of only one consumer.


























































































17so that the deﬁcit is completely determined by the aggregate borrowings and savings
decisions of the consumers. If these are unaﬀected by the ﬁscal policy, the deﬁcit will
remain unchanged.
The example above shows that when consumption tax instruments are suﬃciently
diversiﬁed, irrelevance of deﬁcit restrictions may hold. However, in general as was the case
with no credit restrictions (see Ghiglino and Shell (2000), Example 11), having several
tax instruments is not suﬃcient for irrelevance, which also depends on the length and the
magnitude of the deﬁcit restriction. Indeed, even when there are enough instruments, it
is not assured that qsk
th − τsk
th is positive, i.e. we could have for some s (s = 1,2, ... )a n d
some k (k = 1, ... ,`)t h a tpsk < 0. This would be consistent with the formal model,
but is, of course, inconsistent with free disposal of endowments. As a consequence, the
next proposition which generalizes the former example, gives only a necessary condition
for irrelevance and a suﬃcient condition for weak irrelevance.
Proposition (Relevance of deﬁcit restrictions in economies with consumption
taxes and consumer credit restrictions): Suppose that only anonymous consumption
taxes are available and that the credit constraint of at least one consumer is not binding.
Let x be an allocation that can be implemented as a constitutional equilibrium with a
ﬁscal policy and deﬁcit restriction δ and let r,0 ≤ r<n ,be the number of consumers for
which the credit constraint is binding. Then, if n + r>`the deﬁcit restriction is weakly
(and strongly) relevant. On the other hand, for n + r ≤ ` the deﬁcit restriction is weakly
irrelevant.
Proof: When consumers are potentially credit constrained, demand for commodities may
depend on the individual borrowings or lendings, so that these must be kept constant
when the policy changes. Formally, xtm
th ,w i t hxtm
th = pt · ωt
th − qt
t · xt
th,i sk e p tc o n s t a n t
for constrained consumers. Denote this quantity by b
t
th. Furthermore, since there is some
consumer whose credit constraint is not binding, prices in successive periods are linked.
Therefore, in period t the relevant system consists of 2`−1 conditions on prices and r+n
conditions on individual wealths. Let the consumers whose credit constraint is binding
be denoted by h =1 ,···,rwhile the remaining h = r +1 ,···,nhave non-binding credit
restrictions. Taking into account the restriction on the deﬁcit, the system of 2` + r + n
equations can be written as
18b pt + b τt
















th + pt+1 · ω
t+1
th =( pt1 + τt1


















for i = 1, ... , `, where the R’s, the W’s, and the δ’s are ﬁxed. Suppose that n ≤ `.I nt h e
Appendix, it is shown that it is useful to consider as “free” variables the last `−n prices
of period t: pt,n+1, ... ,pt` and the ﬁrst n prices of period t + 1: pt+1,1, ... ,p t+1,n.T h i s
system, which is linear in 3` unknowns, has a solution if and only if n+r ≤ `. The usual
sign restrictions on the p’s apply so this condition is not suﬃcient for irrelevance. ¤
7. Conclusion
We have considered here a general OG exchange economy with anonymous taxes and
transfers and constraints on individual borrowing. We ask whether or not the set of equi-
librium allocations is aﬀected by constitutional restrictions on the government’s budget
deﬁcit.
The credit constraints are important. With credit constraints on individuals and
only anonymous lump-sum taxes, strong (or global) irrelevance of deﬁcit restrictions is
impossible and weak (or local) irrelevance can obtain only in uninteresting circumstances.
This strongly contrasts with the case without individual credit constraints, where deﬁcit
restrictions are globally (and weakly) irrelevant.
With credit constraints on individuals and only anonymous consumption taxes, global
deﬁcit irrelevance is impossible just as it is for the case without credit constraints. If there
is a suﬃcient number of tax instruments and at least one consumer’s credit constraint
is not binding, then there is weak (or local) irrelevance of the deﬁcit restriction. This
generalizes a similar result for the model without consumer credit constraints.
Consumption taxes are better for avoiding deﬁcit restrictions than are lump-sum taxes.
Consumption taxes, even anonymous consumption taxes, provide a mean for “transferring
income” from one individual to another in the same generation. With only anonymous
lump-sum taxes, intra-generational transfers are not possible.
The present paper along with Ghiglino and Shell (2000) indicates that there can be
limits on the government’s ability to avoid the restrictions on its deﬁcit. Of course, as
19Kotlikoﬀ (1993) and others have argued, there is still plenty scope for the government to
evade (as opposed to “avoid”) the deﬁcit restrictions by altering in its books the timing of
receipts and disbursements, by guaranteeing “oﬀ-the-books” private loans, and so forth.
We stress again that to say the deﬁcit restriction is irrelevant is not to say that the
deﬁcit does not matter. It is likely to matter if individuals condition their (rational or
non-rational) expectations on the deﬁcit.
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Appendix: Rank computations
For notational convenience, we focus attention on the case n ≥ 2. Let the consumers
for whom their credit constraint is binding be h =1 ,...,r while for the remaining, h =
r +1,...n, their credit constraint is not binding. First, consider a consumer of generation
0. It is clear from Ghiglino and Shell (2000) that the set of free parameters left after
20imposing the condition of constant individual demands to these consumers is a set of
dimension l − n. Let us then consider as free the last l − n prices p1,n+1,...,p 1,l.
Second, consider the consumers of generation t,( t =1 ,2,...), with the constraint that
the prices pt1,...,p tn are already ﬁxed (from previous-period conditions).
Using the relationship between the prices in periods t and t+1, the system of equations
associated to a given demand can be written as
ˆ pt +ˆ τt












th =( pt1 + τt1
t )W t




th =( pt1 + τt1














where the quantities Rt
t ∈ Rl−1, Rt
t−1 ∈ Rl, W t
th, Wth and δt are ﬁxed. The system of





Introduce the vectors Pt
0 ∈ Rl−n and P
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Let also W t
t ∈ Rn and Wt ∈ Rn be the vectors of individual wealths. The rank of the
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plus l. Some tedious manipulations similar to those performed in Ghiglino and Shell
(2000), show that generically the above matrix has maximal rank. Then, for l = n + r
the At matrix has full rank 3l.I nt h i sc a s et h es y s t e mh a sa l w a y sas o l u t i o n .T h es a m e
can be said for n + r<l .
Suppose now that l +1=n + r. Then the At matrix is a 3l +1× 3l matrix which
has generically maximal rank 3l. Consider the square 3l + 1 matrix associated to the
augmented system, (At,b t)a n dl e tu sp r o v et h a tR a n k( At,b t)=3 l + 1. Indeed, the last












The determinant of (At,b t)i saﬁrst degree polynomial expression in δt. Therefore, to
prove that the relevant matrix has full rank for an open and dense set of values of δt it
is enough that the coeﬃcient of δt in the polynomial expression is nonzero, which can be
seen to be generically true. Since Rank(A) <R a n k (A,b), the solution set is empty. This
is the borderline case so the same result holds also whenever n + r>l+1 .
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